Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games

Adrian de Groot Ruiz, Theo Offerman and Sander Onderstal

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 91, issue C, 14-25

Abstract: In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is intended to predict actual behavior in a wide range of cheap talk games. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and size of credible deviations. ACDC organizes the results from several cheap talk experiments in which behavior converges to equilibrium, even in cases where other criteria do not make a prediction.

Keywords: Cheap talk; Neologism proofness; Credible deviation; Refinement; ACDC; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:14-25

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.011

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