Discontinuous games with asymmetric information: An extension of Reny's existence theorem

Wei He and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 91, issue C, 26-35

Abstract: We introduce asymmetric information to games with discontinuous payoffs and prove new equilibrium existence theorems. In particular, the seminal work of Reny (1999) is extended to a Bayesian preferences framework.

Keywords: Discontinuous game; Asymmetric information; Bayesian expected utility; Finite payoff security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:26-35

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.013

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