Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model

Tasos Kalandrakis

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 94, issue C, 29-38

Abstract: Computation of exact equilibrium values for n-player divide-the-dollar legislative bargaining games as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) with general quota voting rules, recognition probabilities, and discount factors, can be achieved by solving at most n bivariate square linear systems of equations. The approach recovers Eraslan's (2002) uniqueness result and relies on a characterization of equilibria in terms of two variables that satisfy a pair of piecewise linear equations.

Keywords: Computation of equilibrium; Legislative bargaining; Uniqueness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825615001232
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:94:y:2015:i:c:p:29-38

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.004

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().