Median stable matchings in two-sided markets

Peter Chen, Michael Egesdal, Marek Pycia and M. Bumin Yenmez

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 97, issue C, 64-69

Abstract: We show that generalized median stable matchings exist in many-to-many matching markets when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand.

Keywords: Median stable matchings; Many-to-one matching with wages; Many-to-many matching; Matching with contracts; Strong substitutability; The law of aggregate demand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D44 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:97:y:2016:i:c:p:64-69

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.004

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