How do executive excess compensation affect enterprise technological innovation: Evidence from a panel threshold model of chinese biopharmaceutical companies

Yong Xu, Junzhe Ji, Nicolas Li and Dhruba Borah

Journal of Business Research, 2024, vol. 179, issue C

Abstract: This study examines the levels of executive excess compensation (EEC) that stimulate the quality and efficiency of enterprise technology innovation (ETI). Using a behavioral agency perspective, we investigate how companies achieve superior ETI by providing sufficient incentives to motivate executives to perform to the best of their abilities. We use a panel threshold model based on a sample of Chinese-listed biopharmaceutical companies and find that: (1) providing an EEC between 0.0592 and 0.1907 significantly affects the promotion of ETI quality; (2) regarding ETI efficiency, executives generally do not receive the compensation that they deserve; and (3) the existing EEC has a weak negative impact on ETI efficiency, gradually disappearing as compensation increases. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that restricting EEC to the eastern area and strengthening the supervision of EEC in state-owned enterprises are effective measures for stimulating ETI. We advance the literature by providing guidance on compensation plans to companies in different regions.

Keywords: Excess Compensation; Technological Innovation; Innovation Quality; Innovation Efficiency; Chinese Pharmaceutical Industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:179:y:2024:i:c:s0148296324001875

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2024.114683

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