Conflict, settlement, and the shadow of the future
Michael McBride (mcbride@uci.edu) and
Stergios Skaperdas
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014, vol. 105, issue C, 75-89
Abstract:
We examine a conflictual setting in which adversaries cannot contract on an enforcement variable (arms) and where the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. We show that, as the future becomes more important in this setting, open conflict becomes more likely than settlement. We demonstrate the theoretical robustness of this finding and test it in a laboratory experiment. As predicted, we find that subjects are more likely to engage in destructive conflict as the future becomes more important.
Keywords: War; Settlement; Property rights; Shadow of the future (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D74 H1 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)
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Working Paper: Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future (2009) 
Working Paper: Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future (2009) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:105:y:2014:i:c:p:75-89
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.04.023
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