Selection, tournaments, and dishonesty

Marco Faravelli, Lana Friesen and Lata Gangadharan ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2015, vol. 110, issue C, 160-175

Abstract: We conduct a real effort experiment in which performance is not monitored and participants are paid according to their reported performance. Participants are paid according to a piece rate and a winner-take-all tournament and then select between the two schemes before performing the task one more time. Competition increases dishonesty and lowers output when the payment scheme is exogenously determined. Participants with a higher propensity to be dishonest are more likely to select into competition. However after selection, we find no output difference between piece rate and tournament. This is attributable to a handful of honest individuals who select competition.

Keywords: Dishonesty; Selection; Tournament; Piece rate; Real effort experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

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Working Paper: Selection, Tournaments, and Dishonesty (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:110:y:2015:i:c:p:160-175

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.10.019

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