Corruption, tax evasion and social values

Anastasia Litina () and Theodore Palivos

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2016, vol. 124, issue C, 164-177

Abstract: We provide a theoretical explanation for the vicious circle of political corruption and tax evasion in which countries often fall into. We address this issue in the context of a model with two distinct groups of agents: citizens and politicians. Citizens decide the fraction of their income for which they evade taxes. Politicians decide the fraction of the public budget that they peculate. We show that multiple self-fulfilling equilibria with different levels of corruption can emerge based on the existence of strategic complementarities, indicating that “corruption may corrupt.” Furthermore, we find that standard deterrence policies cannot eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria. Instead, policies that impose a strong moral cost on tax evaders and corrupt politicians can lead to a unique equilibrium.

Keywords: Corruption; Tax evasion; Multiple equilibria; Social stigma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Corruption, Tax Evasion and Social Values (2014)
Working Paper: Corruption, Tax Evasion and Social Values (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:124:y:2016:i:c:p:164-177

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.017

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