Women ask for less (only from men): Evidence from bargaining in the field

Iñigo Hernandez-Arenaz and Nagore Iriberri

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, vol. 152, issue C, 192-214

Abstract: Data from a TV show provide the opportunity to study gender differences and gender interaction effects in bargaining with sizable stakes. A proposer and a responder, who is selected by the proposer, bargain over a fixed pie. Proposers are in a stronger bargaining position because they have a positive outside option and information on the size of the pie, while responders have neither. The matching between male proposers and female responders stands as the most favorable for proposers. Women as responders demand less only from male proposers, which explains the difference in earnings.

Keywords: Bargaining; Gender differences; Gender interaction effects; Field data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 J16 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:152:y:2018:i:c:p:192-214

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.010

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