Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes

Toke R. Fosgaard, Lars Hansen and Erik Wengström

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, vol. 158, issue C, 416-427

Abstract: This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are not linked to political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects to the right of the political spectrum. This difference is to some extent caused by differences in beliefs and cooperation preferences but a substantial part is left unexplained, indicating that left wingers find cooperating under this institution more attractive than right wingers do.

Keywords: Cooperation; Social dilemma; Political ideology; Experiment; Simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D03 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperation, framing and political attitudes (2017)
Working Paper: Cooperation, Framing and Political Attitudes (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:158:y:2019:i:c:p:416-427

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.010

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