Expectations of reciprocity when competitors share information: Experimental evidence

Bernhard Ganglmair (), Alex Holcomb and Noah Myung

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, vol. 170, issue C, 244-267

Abstract: Informal exchange of information among competitors has been well-documented in a variety of industries. We use an indeterminate horizon centipede game to establish an information feedback loop in the laboratory and show that an individual’s beliefs about the recipient’s intentions to reciprocate matter more than a recipient’s ability to do so. This implies that reducing strategic uncertainty about a competitor’s behavior has a stronger effect on information flows than reducing environmental uncertainty (about the competitor’s ability). We further show how a players’ experience within, and across, episodes of information exchange drives beliefs about competitors’ behavior. We conclude by discussing managerial implications.

Keywords: Knowledge diffusion; Information sharing; Reciprocity; Experimental economics; Centipede game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D8 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Expectations of reciprocity when competitors share information: Experimental evidence (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:170:y:2020:i:c:p:244-267

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.006

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