Citizens’ trade-offs in state merger decisions: Evidence from a randomized survey experiment

Sebastian Blesse and Friedrich Heinemann

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, vol. 180, issue C, 438-471

Abstract: Voters dealing with jurisdictional merger decisions face a trade-off between economies of scale and preference costs. Larger jurisdictions could offer cost advantages, but the downside is that policies in larger units may be less aligned to voter preferences. Our study is the first to provide evidence on this trade-off on the individual level in an experimental set-up. For this purpose, we designed a randomized survey experiment and inquired about individual preferences on state mergers on a representative sample of the German population. In line with the decentralization theorem, the support for mergers increases with cost savings and falls with preference costs measured as political alignment. The effects of the cost treatments on merger support are lower for respondents from states that are actually discussed as merger candidates. Effects are also weaker for citizens who have a positive view of their own political participation under the status quo.

Keywords: Survey experiment; Preference formation; Political representation; State-level mergers; Optimal design of federations; Economies of scale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Citizens' trade-offs in state merger decisions: Evidence from a randomized survey experiment (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:180:y:2020:i:c:p:438-471

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.018

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