Warcraft: The legitimacy building of usurpers

Shuo Chen and Xinyu Fan

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021, vol. 184, issue C, 409-431

Abstract: Rulers ascending to the throne differ substantially in their need for legitimization. This paper asks: will a usurper who took power by unlawful means build legitimacy through war? Using warfare data from historical China (750 BCE-1911), we show that usurpers initiated 40.2% more wars than did hereditary rulers against nomadic neighbors. Usurpers waged and won more wars early in their reign and converged to rulers’ average warring frequencies later. To address the endogeneity concern, we use rulers’ birth orders as an instrument for usurper identity. We show that usurpers also outperformed hereditary rulers in other peaceful legitimization strategies such as amnesties and political marriages, which, together with war increased usurpers’ survival odds. However, usurpers were not as proactive in abolishing the vassals, from which many originated.

Keywords: Economic history; Political legitimacy; War; State-building (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H56 N45 N95 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:184:y:2021:i:c:p:409-431

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.01.029

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