Convergence and divergence in dynamic voting with inequality

Corrado Di Guilmi and Giorgos Galanis

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021, vol. 187, issue C, 137-158

Abstract: We test whether the original median voter theorem’s result of political convergence in a two-party system holds when the control variables that influence voters’ preferences endogenously evolve over time and parties are policy motivated. We present a dynamic voting model in which voters’ heterogeneous preferences evolve over time depending on observable common factors and unobservable idiosyncratic characteristics. In such a setting, the convergence of parties’ platforms to the centre is a special case within a range of results that include instability and extreme equilibria. In particular, convergence is achieved not as the result of electoral strategies, but when neither party has enough support to pursue its agenda.

Keywords: Median voter; Dynamic voting; Political preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D72 E71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:187:y:2021:i:c:p:137-158

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.013

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