Strategic curiosity: An experimental study of curiosity and dishonesty

F. Ceren Ay, Joel W. Berge and Katrine B. Nødtvedt

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2024, vol. 217, issue C, 287-297

Abstract: In this study, we investigate the motives behind additional rolling behavior in a die-rolling task and explore the strategic use of curiosity when participants are tempted to report dishonestly. We conducted a virtual die-rolling experiment with four conditions, manipulating the number of allowed rolls and the type of die used (numbers or symbols) to understand the factors driving participants to roll the die more than once. Our findings reveal that participants tend to roll more when observing lower first-roll outcomes, and this finding holds regardless of whether the die displays numbers or random symbols. Dishonest participants tend to stop rolling at the highest possible outcome, indicating a pattern of strategic curiosity. However, we find no variation in dishonesty across treatments, suggesting dishonest individuals self-select into rolling more and search for higher numbers to support their dishonest reports. Therefore, our study offers mixed support for the justified ethicality theory and sheds light on the motivations underlying additional rolling behavior, contributing to a better understanding of the factors that drive strategic information acquisition.

Keywords: Information acquisition; Curiosity; Dishonesty; Strategic behavior; Lying cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D82 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:217:y:2024:i:c:p:287-297

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.039

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