Why informationally diverse teams need not form, even when efficient
Ashwin Kambhampati,
Carlos Segura-Rodriguez and
Peng Shao
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2024, vol. 226, issue C
Abstract:
We introduce a model of team formation in which workers first match and then produce correlated signals about an unknown state. While it is efficient to maximize the number of informationally diverse teams, such teams need not form in equilibrium when output is shared equally. Our analysis identifies the two sources of matching inefficiency: (i) workers may form diverse teams that are beneficial to its members, but force excluded workers to form homogeneous teams, and (ii) even when a diverse team is efficient, a worker may prefer to join a homogeneous team if she can exert less effort than her teammate. We completely characterize each inefficiency.
Keywords: Matching; Teams; Information acquisition; Correlation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D83 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:226:y:2024:i:c:s0167268124002956
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106689
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