Strategic priority-based course allocation

Antonio Romero-Medina and Matteo Triossi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2024, vol. 226, issue C

Abstract: We introduce the conditional acceptance mechanism for solving the course allocation problem under priorities. This mechanism implements the set of stable allocations in both Nash equilibrium and undominated Nash equilibrium when preferences and priorities are substitutable. We model a post-allocation adjustment mechanism using a repeated version of the conditional acceptance mechanism that mitigates the inefficiencies caused by deviating from equilibrium. Both mechanisms are straightforward to implement, simplify the elicitation of students’ preferences, and share features with currently employed course allocation mechanisms.

Keywords: Conditional acceptance; Immediate acceptance; Multi-unit assignment problem; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:226:y:2024:i:c:s016726812400307x

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106701

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