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The dynamics of the legal system

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Bruno Deffains and Bruno Lovat

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2011, vol. 79, issue 1-2, 95-107

Abstract: We present a dynamic model of noncontractual litigation in which the parties' decision whether to litigate depends on information produced by courts and, vice versa, the courts' involvement in the lawmaking process depends on the cases proposed by the parties. Thereby, we integrate in one model the two main functions of the judiciary (adjudication and lawmaking) and study their interplay. Our model offers a dynamic, cyclical perspective on the evolution of the legal system over time and sheds new light on the causes for high litigation rates and on judge-made law versus statutes.

Keywords: Incompleteness; of; law; Litigation; Legislation; Adjudication; Judge-made; law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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