Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution

Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski

Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, vol. 145, issue 5, 1951-1967

Abstract: We study a model of non-cooperative multilateral unanimity bargaining on a full-dimensional payoff set. The probability distribution with which the proposing player is selected in each bargaining round follows an irreducible Markov process. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down with an exogenous probability and the next round starts with the complementary probability. As the risk of exogenous breakdown vanishes, stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to the weighted Nash bargaining solution with the stationary distribution of the Markov process as the weight vector.

Keywords: Nash; bargaining; solution; Subgame; perfect; equilibrium; Stationary; strategies; Markov; process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)

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Working Paper: Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric nash bargaining solution (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:5:p:1951-1967

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