Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria

Vladyslav Nora and Hiroshi Uno

Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 150, issue C, 866-877

Abstract: We provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997) [11], Morris and Ui (2005) [15]. The condition is formulated for games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real-valued function on the set of action profiles such that there is a single player for whom minimizing the function implies choosing her best response, and for the other players maximizing the function implies choosing their best responses. In a game with a saddle function the set of correlated equilibria that induce an expectation of the saddle function greater or equal to its maximin value is robust to incomplete information.

Keywords: Incomplete information; Robustness; Potential; Team-maximin equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:150:y:2014:i:c:p:866-877

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.005

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