Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution

Jonathan Newton and Simon Angus ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 157, issue C, 172-187

Abstract: This study considers waiting times for populations to achieve efficient social coordination. Belloc and Bowles [1] conjecture that coalitional behavior will hasten such coordination. This turns out to be true when every member of the population interacts with every other member, but does not extend to more complex networks of interaction. Although it is in the interest of every player to coordinate on a single globally efficient norm, coalitional behavior at a local level can greatly slow, as well as hasten, convergence to efficiency.

Keywords: Evolution; Coalition; Social norm; Reform; Conservatism; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:172-187

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.003

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