 Stability in electoral competition: A case for multiple votesJournal of Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 161, issue C, 76-102 Abstract: It is well known that the Hotelling–Downs model generically fails to admit an equilibrium when voting takes place under the plurality rule (Osborne, 1993). This paper studies the Hotelling–Downs model considering that each voter is allowed to vote for up to k candidates and demonstrates that an equilibrium exists for a non-degenerate class of distributions of voters' ideal policies – which includes all log-concave distributions – if and only ifk≥2. That is, the plurality rule (k=1) is shown to be the unique k-vote rule which generically precludes stability in electoral competition. Regarding the features of k-vote rules' equilibria, first, we show that there is no convergent equilibrium and, then, we fully characterize all divergent equilibria. We study comprehensively the simplest kind of divergent equilibria (two-location ones) and we argue that, apart from existing for quite a general class of distributions when k≥2, they have further attractive properties – among others, they are robust to free-entry and to candidates' being uncertain about voters' preferences. Keywords: Hotelling–Downs model; Equilibrium; Multiple votes (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:161:y:2016:i:c:p:76-102 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.003 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.