Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating

Martin Dufwenberg and Martin A. Dufwenberg
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Martin Dufwenberg

Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 175, issue C, 248-264

Abstract: We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, referred to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium, characterized by three intuitive properties, captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well.

Keywords: Cheating; Lying; Costs; Audience; Perceived cheating aversion; Psychological game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (71)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Lies in Disguise - A Theoretical Analysis of Cheating (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:175:y:2018:i:c:p:248-264

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.013

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