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Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable

Jun Zhang

Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 180, issue C, 167-177

Abstract: We study the assignment of indivisible objects to agents without using monetary transfers. We prove that, regardless of whether the number of objects is sufficient, a mechanism that satisfies ex-post Pareto efficiency, equal treatment of equals, equal total assignment (ETA), and uniform-head fairness (UHF) must be strongly manipulable by a group of agents. In other words, by misreporting their preferences, all group members can obtain lotteries that strictly first-order stochastically dominate the lotteries they would have obtained by reporting their true preferences. ETA requires that agents obtain equal total probability shares of objects. UHF requires that if all agents have equal preferences over a subset of objects and prefer the objects in that subset to the remaining objects, then they obtain equal probability shares of the objects in that subset. The random priority and probabilistic serial mechanisms satisfy our axioms.

Keywords: Random assignment; Efficiency; Fairness; Strong group manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:167-177

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.005

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