What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design

Itai Ashlagi and Afshin Nikzad

Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 190, issue C

Abstract: Many school districts apply the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm after ties among students are resolved exogenously. This paper compares two common tie-breaking rules: one in which all schools use a common lottery, and one in which each school uses a separate independent lottery. We identify the balance between supply and demand as the determining factor in this comparison.

Keywords: Market design; School choice; Matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:190:y:2020:i:c:s0022053120301137

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105120

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