Designing referenda: An economist's pessimistic perspective

Siyang Xiong

Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 191, issue C

Abstract: Recently, a trend has developed around the world for referenda to be used to determine binary social decisions. In a couple of setups, we prove impossibility results of the following form: a binary social goal can be achieved via a referendum if and only if it is dictatorial. Hence, our results challenge the conventional wisdom in social choice theory that social decisions are permissive in two-outcome environments (May's Theorem).

Keywords: Referendum; Social choice; Dictator; Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:191:y:2021:i:c:s0022053120301265

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105133

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