Selling two identical objects

Sushil Bikhchandani and Debasis Mishra

Journal of Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 200, issue C

Abstract: It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic mechanisms are optimal for selling two identical, indivisible objects to a single buyer. We analyze two settings: (i) decreasing marginal values (DMV) and (ii) increasing marginal values (IMV). Thus, the values of the buyer for the two units are not independent.

Keywords: Multi-object auctions; Revenue maximization; Multidimensional mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Selling Two Identical Objects (2021)
Working Paper: Selling Two Identical Objects (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:200:y:2022:i:c:s0022053121002143

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105397

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