The value of a coordination game

Willemien Kets, Wouter Kager and Alvaro Sandroni

Journal of Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 201, issue C

Abstract: The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new theory of the value of coordination games. The theory delivers testable comparative statics on the value and delivers novel insights relevant to policy design. For example, policies that shift behavior in the desired direction can make everyone worse off, and policies that increase everyone's payoffs can reduce welfare.

Keywords: Coordination; Supermodular games; Value; Comparative statics on welfare; Policy design; Strategic complementarities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D60 D80 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Value of a Coordination Game (2021)
Working Paper: The Value of a Coordination Game (2021)
Working Paper: The Value of the Coordination Game (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:201:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122000096

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105419

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