The effects of rivalry on scientific progress under public vs private learning

Heidrun Hoppe-Wewetzer, Georgios Katsenos and Emre Ozdenoren

Journal of Economic Theory, 2023, vol. 212, issue C

Abstract: We offer a model of scientific progress in which uncertainty resolves over time. We show that rivalry leads to less experimentation, extending results for preemption games to experimentation with uncertain outcomes. We compare experimentation duration and welfare when experimental outcomes are publicly versus privately observable. We show that public learning can generate more experimentation and higher welfare when uncertainty about the feasibility of a breakthrough is large; breakthroughs are rare even when they are feasible; and experiments produce results infrequently. Our results shed light on recent criticism of the science system.

Keywords: Stopping game; Experimentation; Learning; Preemption; Multiarmed bandit problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:212:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000984

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105702

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