Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching

Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto and Arunava Sen

Journal of Economic Theory, 2024, vol. 216, issue C

Abstract: This paper considers implementation in undominated strategies by finite mechanisms, where multiple outcomes may be implemented at a single state of the world. We establish a sufficient condition for implementation applicable in a general environment with private values. We apply it to three well-known environments and obtain strikingly permissive results. In the single-object auction, the second-price auction with a reserve price can be outperformed in terms of revenue. In the public good provision problem, the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism can be outperformed from the viewpoint of a designer who wishes to minimise deficit subject to efficiency. In the two-sided matching environment where preferences on one side of the market are private information, the social choice correspondence that outputs all stable matchings at every preference profile, is implementable.

Keywords: Implementation in undominated strategies; Finite mechanisms; Outperforming dominant-strategy implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:216:y:2024:i:c:s0022053123001795

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105783

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