Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts

P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Journal of Economic Theory, 2024, vol. 216, issue C

Abstract: We introduce the notion of expectational equilibrium in a general specification of the many-to-one matching with contracts model. The endogenous variables in an expectational equilibrium are expectations about tradable contracts. Expectational equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to stable outcomes. Expectational equilibrium unifies all the other approaches used in the literature so far, in particular Walrasian equilibrium, Drèze equilibrium, and market clearing cutoffs. It also applies to cases where contracts do not involve money as well as cases where there is a smallest monetary unit of account.

Keywords: Matching; Competitive equilibrium; Stable outcomes; Expectational equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D45 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:216:y:2024:i:c:s002205312400005x

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105799

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