Communication on networks and strong reliability

Marie Laclau, Ludovic Renou and Xavier Venel

Journal of Economic Theory, 2024, vol. 217, issue C

Abstract: We consider sender–receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distant nodes in a communication network. We show that if the network has two disjoint paths of communication between the sender and the receiver, then we can replicate all equilibrium outcomes not only of the direct communication game (i.e., when the sender and the receiver communicate directly with each other) but also of the mediated game (i.e., when the sender and the receiver communicate with the help of a mediator).

Keywords: Cheap talk; Direct; Mediated; Communication; Protocol; Network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Communication on networks and strong reliability (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:217:y:2024:i:c:s0022053124000280

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105822

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