Is there a taste for racial discrimination amongst employers?

Alex Bryson and Arnaud Chevalier

Labour Economics, 2015, vol. 34, issue C, 51-63

Abstract: Research on employers' hiring discrimination is limited by the unlawfulness of such activity. Consequently, researchers have focused on the intention to hire. Instead, we rely on a virtual labour market, the Fantasy Football Premier League, where employers can freely exercise their taste for racial discrimination in terms of hiring and firing. The setting allows us to eliminate co-worker, consumer-based and statistical discrimination as potential sources of discrimination, thus isolating the effect of taste-based discrimination. We find no evidence of racial discrimination, either in initial hiring or through the season, in a context where employers are fully aware of current and prospective workers' productivity.

Keywords: Race; Labour market discrimination; Football (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J15 J23 J24 J71 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labeco:v:34:y:2015:i:c:p:51-63

DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2015.03.002

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