Take-up and labor supply responses to disability insurance earnings limits
Judit Krekó,
Daniel Prinz () and
Andrea Weber
Labour Economics, 2024, vol. 89, issue C
Abstract:
In most disability insurance programs beneficiaries lose some or all of their benefits if they earn above an earnings threshold. While intended to screen out applicants with high remaining working capacity, earnings limits can also distort the labor supply of beneficiaries. We use a reduction in the earnings limit in Hungary to evaluate this trade-off and examine screening and labor supply responses. We find that the policy changed selection into the program modestly but reduced labor supply on the intensive margin significantly. These findings suggest that the earnings threshold should be higher.
Keywords: Disability insurance; Labor supply; Policy analysis; Earnings limit; Disability benefit; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927537124000782
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
Working Paper: Take-Up and Labor Supply Responses to Disability Insurance Earnings Limits (2023) 
Working Paper: Take-Up and Labor Supply Responses to Disability Insurance Earnings Limits (2023) 
Working Paper: Take-Up and Labor Supply Responses to Disability Insurance Earnings Limits (2022) 
Working Paper: Take-up and Labor Supply Responses to Disability Insurance Earnings Limits (2022) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labeco:v:89:y:2024:i:c:s0927537124000782
DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2024.102583
Access Statistics for this article
Labour Economics is currently edited by A. Ichino
More articles in Labour Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().