Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology

Alejandro Caparros and Michael Finus ()
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Alejandro Caparros: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas

No 52/16, Department of Economics Working Papers from University of Bath, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze the formation of public good agreements under the weakest-link technology. Cooperation on migration policies, money laundering measures and biodiversity conservation e§orts are prime examples of this technology. Whereas for symmetric players, policy coordination is not necessary, for asymmetric players cooperation matters but fails, in the absence of transfers. In contrast, with an optimal transfer scheme, asymmetry may not be an obstacle but an asset for cooperation. Counterintuitively, a very skewed distribution of interests may allow even the grand coalition being stable. We characterize various types and degrees of asymmetry and relate them to the stability of agreements and associate gains from cooperation. We compare our results with those obtained under the well-known summation technology and demonstrate that they can be derived under much more general conditions.

Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology (2020)
Working Paper: Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology (2019)
Working Paper: Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology (2019)
Working Paper: Public good agreements under the weakest-link technology (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eid:wpaper:58129

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