Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market

Wieland Müller, Werner Güth (), Jan Potters and Susanne Büchner ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set their quantities before market clearing. Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market, only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all? We find that preemption tends to be asymmetric in the sense that it is restricted to only one side of the market (buyers or sellers).

Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2005-08
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Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market (2006)
Working Paper: Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market (2006)
Working Paper: Endogenous Preemption on Both Sides of a Market (2005)
Working Paper: Endogenous Preemption on Both Sides of a Market (2005)
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