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Task Transcending Satisficing - An Experimental Study

Werner Güth (), Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling () and Ev Martin ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: The paper explores the applicability of bounded rationality theory. In particular, we investigate whether basic principles of aspiration formation and satisficing behavior are transferable between similar situations. Individuals are sequentially confronted with two risky investment tasks, a simple and a more complex one. Initially elicited state-contingent aspirations can be used to predict actual portfolio selection in both tasks. We explore whether individual characteristics of satisficing apply to both scenarios. Results indicate that stated aspirations frequently cannot be fulfilled. However, aspiration formation itself is highly transferable between tasks.

Keywords: bounded rationality; aspirations; investment decisions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D81 G11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2006-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-fin
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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