Dynamic coordination via organizational routines

Andreas Blume, April Franco and Paul Heidhues ()

No ESMT-11-10, ESMT Research Working Papers from ESMT European School of Management and Technology

Abstract: We investigate dynamic coordination among members of a problem-solving team who receive private signals about which of their actions are required for a (static) coordinated solution and who have repeated opportunities to explore different action combinations. In this environment ordinal equilibria, in which agents condition only on how their signals rank their actions and not on signal strength, lead to simple patterns of behavior that have a natural interpretation as routines. These routines partially solve the team's coordination problem by synchronizing the team's search efforts and prove to be resilient to changes in the environment by being ex post equilibria, to agents having only a coarse understanding of other agents' strategies by being fully cursed, and to natural forms of agents' overconfidence. The price of this resilience is that optimal routines are frequently suboptimal equilibria.

Keywords: coordination games; organizational routines; decentralized information; ex-post equilibria; cursed equilibria; multi-agent learning; rational learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
Date: 2011-09-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta and nep-gth
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http://static.esmt.org/publications/workingpapers/ESMT-11-10.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic coordination via organizational routines (2021)
Working Paper: Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines (2013)
Working Paper: Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esm:wpaper:esmt-11-10

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