The Core of a Partition Function Game

László Kóczy ()

Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven

Abstract: We consider partition function games and introduce new definitions of the core that include the effects of externalities. We assume that all players behave rationally and that all stable outcomes arising are consistent with the appropriate generalised concept of the core. The result is a recursive definition of the core where residual subgames are considered as games with fewer players and with a partition function that captures the externalities of the deviating coalition. Some properties of the new concepts are discussed.

Keywords: new economy; internet; firm performance; e-procurement; e-business Classification-JEL: D0; L0; O3; M0 Creation-Date: 2000-03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Core of a Partition Function Game (2001)
Working Paper: The Core of a Partition Function Game (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0025

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