A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons

László Kóczy ()

Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven

Abstract: In the model of Funaki and Yamato (1999) the tragedy of the commons can be avoided with pessimistic players, while this does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical simulations of simple games where the conclusions coincide or are less sensitive to behavioural assumptions.

Date: 2002-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/500558/1/Dps0217.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons (2002)
Working Paper: A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0217

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven
Bibliographic data for series maintained by library EBIB ().