The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible

László Kóczy () and Luc Lauwers

Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven

Abstract: For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation - which we label outsider independent - is employed.

Date: 2002-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: The coalition structure core is accessible (2004)
Working Paper: The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0219

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