Competition Between Auctions

Ernan Haruvy, Peter Popkowski Leszczyc, Octavian Carare, James Cox, Eric A. Greenleaf, Wolfgang Jank, Sandy Jap, Young-Hoon Park and Michael H. Rothkopf

No 2008-02, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of the art of competition between auctions. We consider three different types of competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and competition between auctioneers vying for auction traffic. We highlight the newest experimental, statistical and analytical methods in the analysis of competition between auctions.

Keywords: auctions; bidding; competition; auction formats; auction houses (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2008-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-exp
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2008-02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Competition between auctions (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exc:wpaper:2008-02

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by J. Todd Swarthout ().