The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries

Michael Finus (), Raoul Schneider and Pedro Pintassilgo
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Raoul Schneider: Department of Economics, Ulm University
Pedro Pintassilgo: Faculty of Economics, University of Algarve

No 1103, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: We argue that international fisheries are a prime example to study the impact of multiple characteristics on the incentive structure of impure public good provision. The degree of technical excludability is related to the pattern of fish migration, the degree of socially constructed excludability is captured by the design of international law and the degree of rivalry is reflected by the growth rate of the resource. We construct a bioeconomic model, including the high seas and exclusive economic zones in order to study the incentives to form stable fully or partially cooperative agreements. We show that the spatial allocation of property rights is crucial for the success of cooperation as long as technical excludability is sufficiently high. Moreover, we show how economic and ecological factors influence the success of cooperation.

Keywords: pure and impure public goods; technical and socially constructed nonexcludability; property rights; coalition formation; free-riding; bioeconomic model; shared fish stocks; regional fisheries management organizations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 F53 H87 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-env and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:1103

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