Central bank independence and inflation: a note

Charles Carlstrom and Timothy Fuerst

No 621, Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: We document increased central bank independence within the set of industrialized nations. This increased independence can account for nearly two thirds of the improved inflation performance of these nations over the last two decades.

Keywords: Banks and banking, Central; Inflation (Finance) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Journal Article: CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND INFLATION: A NOTE (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0621

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DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-200621

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