EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence

Kevin Murphy (kjmurphy@usc.edu) and Robert Gibbons

Working Papers from Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center

Keywords: contracts; compensation; capital market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence (1992) Downloads
Working Paper: Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence (1991) Downloads
Working Paper: OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS IN THE PRESENCE OF CAREER CONCERNS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (1990)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:robume:90-09

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH CENTER, WILLIAM E. SIMON GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, ROCHESTER NEW YORK 14627 U.S.A. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel (krichel@openlib.org).

 
Page updated 2025-01-07
Handle: RePEc:fth:robume:90-09