Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence

Emrah Arbak and Marie Claire Villeval

No 707, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: In social dilemmas, leading a team by making heroic efforts may prove costly, especially if the followers are not adequately motivated to make similar sacrifices. Attempting to understand what motivates these seemingly selfless individuals to lead, we report the results of a two-stage public good experiment with endogenous timing. Even though it turns out to be costly on average, a large proportion of our subjects volunteer to lead. Our findings suggest that a fraction of these leaders are socially concerned, while others expect to distill some personal gain, possibly of non-pecuniary nature. The composition of the team also matters, as publicizing certain attributes of a subject’s teammates has an impact on her decision to lead. Lastly, though voluntary leaders improve efficiency in their team, they are not necessarily more influential than randomly imposed leaders.

Keywords: endogenous switching models; experiment; influence; leadership; voluntary contribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C92 D63 J33 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2007-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2007/0707.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence (2007)
Working Paper: Endogenous Leadership: Selection and Influence (2007)
Working Paper: Endogenous Leadership: Selection and Influence (2007)
Working Paper: Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence (2006)
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Working Paper: Endogenous Leadership - Selection and Influence (2006)
Working Paper: Endogenous Leadership - Selection and Influence (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:0707

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