The Corona-Pandemic: A Game-theoretic Perspective on Regional and Global Governance

Alejandro Caparros () and Michael Finus ()
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Alejandro Caparros: Institute for Public Goods and Policies, Spanish National Research Council

No 2020-10, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: We argue that the incentive structure of all individual and coordinated measures across countries to contain the Corona-pandemic is that of a weakest-link public good game. We discuss a selection of theoretical and experimental key results of weakest-link games and interpret them in the light of the Corona-pandemic. First, we highlight that experimental evidence does not support the assumption that coordination can be trivially solved, even among symmetric players. Second, we argue that for asymmetric countries the weakest-link game does not only pose a problem of coordination, but also a problem of cooperation. Third, we show how and under which conditions self-enforcing treaties can foster cooperation. We account for the possibility that countries make mistakes when choosing their actions. Finally, we provide a list of research gaps.

Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: The Corona-Pandemic: A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Regional and Global Governance (2020)
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