Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited

Ali Ozkes and Remzi Sanver

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Abstract: We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.

Keywords: anonymity; eciency; neutrality; resoluteness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03341695v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, 57 (1), pp.97-113. ⟨10.1007/s00355-020-01308-5⟩

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Journal Article: Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited (2021)
Working Paper: Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03341695

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01308-5

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