Endogenous preferences in games with type indeterminate players

Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky

PSE Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we extend the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making and show that TI-games open a new field of strategic interaction. We first establish an equivalence result between static games of incomplete information and static TI-games. We next develop a new solution concept for non-commuting dynamic TI-games. The updating rule captures the novelty brought about by Type Indeterminacy namely that in addition to affecting information and payoffs, the action of a player impacts on the profile of types. We provide an example showing that TI-game predictions cannot be obtained as Bayes Nash equilibrium of the corresponding classical game.

Keywords: type indeterminacy; games; endogeneous preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-cta, nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-hpe
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00564895v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Endogenous preferences in games with Type-Indeterminate Players (2010)
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