Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving

Thomas Garcia, Sébastien Massoni and Marie Claire Villeval

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Abstract: A donation may have ambiguous costs or ambiguous benefits. In a laboratory experiment, we show that individuals use this ambiguity strategically as a moral wiggle room to behave less generously without feeling guilty. Such excuse-driven behavior is more pronounced when the costs of a donation-rather than its benefits-are ambiguous. However, the importance of excuse-driven behavior is comparable under ambiguity and under risk. Individuals exploit any type of uncertainty as an excuse not to give, regardless of the nature of this uncertainty.

Keywords: Ambiguity; excuse-driven behavior; charitable giving; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01934606v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2020)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2020)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and Excuse-Driven Behavior in Charitable Giving (2019)
Working Paper: Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving (2018)
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